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Conceptual Framework for Greenhouse Gas 
Sequestration Alternatives 
 
  Executive Summary 
 
The earth has a limited atmospheric capacity to absorb more greenhouse gases generally, 
and carbon dioxide in particular.  It also has a limited capacity for agricultural lands to 
store a stock of carbon that might be drawn from the atmosphere and thus help alleviate 
the global warming problem. There are alternative mechanisms and mixes of mechanisms 
that might be used to address both scarcities and to work within the atmospheric limits on 
emissions and agricultural limits represented the capacity of soil and land to store carbon. 
These include   a) government regulation, b) tax and subsidy programs, c) spontaneous 
evolution of markets, and d) cap and trade mechanisms.  
 
 An overview of each type of mechanism highlights the problems they incur. 
While subsidy and regulation programs have helped address a variety of natural resources 
conservation problems, some level of these problems generally persists and may be 
affected by changes in funding levels.  Also, while a number of new activities have been 
stirred by the Kyoto Protocol, including carbon banks, international carbon certification 
firms and environmental product financial and brokerage firms, and unique public-private 
sector partnerships, perhaps none of this will produce much of substance unless 
governments first set carbon dioxide emission limits.  It has become clear that in order to 
solve such public good problems, i.e., where there is little individual incentive to invest in 
solving the problem, that government approaches and markets must be jointly designed 
and implemented. 
 
The public policy experiment with sulfur provides an example of how a market 
system might work if emission caps were in place.  Government set emission limits in 
1990.  During the last 10 years or so, we have experienced the emergence of an active 
and quite effective sulfur allowances market. The market is helping firms find the least 
cost way to meet the emissions limits set through governmental action.  Lessons learned 
in setting caps, distributing initial allowances, and facilitating sulfur allowances trading 
suggest that marketing can work; politics may play a lesser role than we might anticipate; 
markets where no markets existed before can develop; trading is surprisingly adaptive 
and can handle surprises; and, care must be taken to not give away too many allowances 
at the outset.  Generally, the sulfur market has been deemed by most observers to be  a 
success, reflecting a joint legitimization of both the government and the market.  It is 
worth exploring the degree to which factors involved in carbon markets may be similar to 
or different from those involved in the sulfur market. 
 
In regards to carbon sequestration the direction most often discussed in the U.S. 
and on the global scene moves away from direct regulations; green payment and subsidy, 
as well as programs that tax pollutants. The direction, rather, seems in part toward the 
baseline and credit systems that are largely spontaneous responses by the private sector to 
governmental emissions caps or the prospect of those caps.  The latter involves both 
proactive government and equally proactive private parties to the market,..   A case study 
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approach could be taken wherein a carbon storage market mechanism could be designed 
and tested in Nebraska. A simulated market might be developed as a case study and 
perhaps tested with actual trades in carbon offsets in stock (COIS) certificates 
representing carbon stored in Nebraska land.  
 
During the interim, and while such a test case is demonstrated, Nebraskans need to 
carefully watch the progress of two pieces of legislation moving through the U.S. 
congress, one titled the “Conservation Security Act of 2001” and the other “The Clean 
Power Act of 2001.”  The former proposes green payments to farmers and ranchers for 
applying certain kinds of conservation practices and technologies that, among other 
things, lead to more carbon being sequestered and stored in agricultural land.  The latter 
set carbon emission limits on U.S. power plants at the level of emissions in 1990, which 
could well lead to emission allowance markets in carbon.  Intriguingly, the two acts run 
somewhat counter to each other, in that the former does not propose to use market forces 
to solve the carbon problem while the latter does so.  It remains an open question as to 
where the U. S. Congress will move on these two fronts, with the outcome having 
substantive implications for the next steps that Nebraskans might take to be a part of the 
solution to the carbon and global warming problem. 
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Conceptual Framework for Greenhouse Gas 
Sequestration Alternatives1 
 
 
Gary D. Lynne and Colby E. Kruse2 
 
 
Climate change is “the granddaddy of all public goods” 
                 (Nordhaus, 1991 cited in Hahn, 1998, p. 60) 
 
 
Climate change is an ongoing, natural phenomenon harkening back to the 
beginning of time.  Human activities, however, can lead to more rapid changes bringing 
about stresses that may be difficult to handle by plant and animal systems and by the 
humans who depend on said systems.  It is this possibility that has led to the concern with 
greenhouse gases generally, and with carbon dioxide and the possibility to sequester 
carbon in agricultural lands, in particular.  It is hoped that perhaps terrestrial systems 
could perhaps provide a substantive sink for the excessive amounts of carbon being 
released to the atmosphere from the burning of hydrocarbons (U.S. Department of 
Energy, 1999).  In effect, we would store the extra carbon in plant material and land.  
From a political economic perspective, the essence of the problem reduces down, 
first, to recognizing two scarce resources, and second, to choosing an appropriate 
response mechanism to address the scarcities.   The two scarce resources are   a) the 
capacity of the atmosphere to process and otherwise accommodate more greenhouse 
gases, especially carbon dioxide, and b) the capacity of agricultural activities to sequester 
and  to store carbon.  The various forms of response mechanisms include a) government 
                                                 
1 This background paper was prepared under contract with the University of Nebraska Public Policy 
Center,  September, 2001. 
2 Lynne is professor, Department of Agricultural Economics and the School of Natural Resource Sciences, 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln.  Kruse is a Graduate Research Assistant funded through the Agricultural 
Research Division.  Both authors are in the Institute of Agriculture and Natural Resources at the University. 
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regulation, b) tax and subsidy programs, c) spontaneous evolution of markets, and d)  cap 
and trade mechanisms.   We might also expect that complex mixes of these mechanisms 
may emerge. This is to say, while some carbon dioxide and other gases are essential to 
maintaining global temperatures and otherwise supporting life on the planet, excessive 
amounts may lead to great instability in the climate, and perhaps even lead to major long 
term consequences for life itself.   We need to design mechanisms to deal with this 
possibility.  Unfortunately, we do not really know the thresholds so we do not know 
exactly if we are in a situation of scarcity already, nor do we know the exact nature of the 
scarcity we need to be watching for, which makes it difficult to choose a mechanism(s).  
Said somewhat differently, we do not know the point at which rising levels of greenhouse 
gases could lead to cataclysmic outcomes, and the nature of the safe minimum standard 
we need to put in place.  As a result, it becomes virtually impossible to decide before the 
fact which is the best mechanism(s) to address the problem. 
In light of the uncertainty involved in this matter, the legal and economic 
challenge is to narrow the range of appropriate mechanism(s) for addressing the scarcity, 
and thus be positioned to move rapidly to design and choose a mechanism(s) that will 
resolve the problem no matter how and when it ultimately emerges.  Flexibility and 
resiliency in the mechanism seems a prudent objective, in the face of the even more 
prudent objective being that of seeking  a safe minimum standard for global warming. 
In addition to the uncertainty, solving the resulting climate change problem also 
becomes a substantive challenge due to the public good aspects of greenhouse gases, as 
the quote from Nordhaus suggests.  Describing greenhouse gas as a public good is to 
simply recognize that once such a gas is released to the atmosphere it affects everyone; as 
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economists say, the additional or marginal cost of providing one more unit of it to 
someone else is zero, in that all experience the outcomes whether they wish to or not.  As 
a result, it is also the case that individuals, regions, and countries will tend to under-invest 
in both producing the gas for the cases when it is doing good (e.g., enhancing yields in 
corn fields) and in mitigation of the gas when it is doing bad (e.g., causing more severe 
storms in Nebraska).   It follows that in order to achieve the economically efficient level 
of greenhouse gases that the government and other organizations of private individuals  
perhaps will have to ban together to help solve the problem.  Such activity is legitimate.  
Yet, it is equally as legitimate that markets in emissions and carbon storage could also 
play a role.  Due to the public good nature of greenhouse gases, then, the most 
appropriate mechanism will likely include a kind of symbiotic balance of both 
government (or other community effort) and market activity, both legitimized, and both 
playing key roles.  It will likely not work well in this case, even though it has been our 
history with respect to the environmental debate to continue with the largely 
unproductive dialogue over which is better, government or market, in the matter of 
environmental enhancement (see Lynne, 2001).    
In order to understand the reason for the focus in this background paper, most 
recent attention has been placed on the cap and trade mechanism.  New interest has arisen 
in the potential for bringing market mechanisms into environmental enhancement through 
legitimizing roles for both government (public) and market interests through this 
mechanism.  We will also delineate the main features of other time honored mechanisms, 
however, including direct government regulation and control; tax and subsidy including 
green payment programs; and spontaneously arising markets.   
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We especially address how these mechanisms might help in creating a new 
commodity market in carbon stored in agricultural land.  We highlight the main design 
parameters for such a mechanism aimed at achieving and maintaining a safe minimum 
standard for the global climate through using storage. The matter of actual market design 
parameters is addressed in the companion paper (Lynne and Kruse, 2001). 
 
An Allegory on Mechanisms Leading to a Mechanisms Framework 
 
Perhaps we can start to understand the issues in narrowing the range of response 
mechanisms with this allegory (after McCloskey, 1985, pp. 107-110)  about allocating 
football tickets, certainly a less consequential problem, but yet a helpful story for  
thinking about what we face.  Consider the scarcity and mechanisms used to address this 
scarcity through the allocation and re-allocation of football tickets to a Husker football 
game.  The number of seats, and the tickets, in Memorial Coliseum are in scarce supply.   
How do we initially set the seating capacity and allocate the seats and then at some point 
in the future best re-allocate this scarce supply of seats and tickets? 
First, we have to understand that the scarcity itself was created by people.  
Decisions were made to build and re-build Memorial Coliseum to its current capacity.  In 
effect, Nebraskans set a “cap” on the seating, and seats were initially allocated through a 
kind of “trading” process.  A complex political, legislative and administrative mechanism 
interacting with the market for tickets was used to establish this cap, pointing to the 
reality that such decision forums can indeed successfully define a cap and initially 
allocate the capacity.  Second, we have to understand that somehow the tickets will be 
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reallocated.   Intriguingly, humans have a way of accomplishing these things, and do find 
solutions.  We might call that which emerges the “trade.”   
Let’s first look at the initial allocation within the cap.  We might, say, a week or 
so before the first season, load all the tickets onto an airplane and, then, fly over the state 
dropping them out.  This method would be biased toward those with good ticket 
searching skills.   Such as not to bias the distribution on such grounds, we might try a 
lottery instead, perhaps randomly drawing driver’s license numbers to allocate the tickets 
to Nebraska residents.  This one also has bias, first, toward licensed drivers, and, second, 
toward residents: How about the avid Nebraska fan that lives in Council Bluffs?  Still 
another way would be to give the initial bundle of tickets to the unicameral, making this a 
Legislative Matter. The unicameral may want to subsidize certain classes of users by 
giving some tickets at a low or reduced rate; others might be taxed such that these groups 
can be subsidized.  In other cases, the unicameral might simply make a political decision 
to allocate the tickets in certain ways without any kind of tax and subsidy activity, i.e., 
perhaps creating a Department of Football Ticket Allocation. This agency may directly 
control who obtains the tickets each year.   
Alternatively, a Special Purpose Football Ticket District(s), perhaps one in each 
part of Nebraska, might also be created. We might also create a Football Tickets Court to 
handle disputes, and even give the Court some constitutional mandates, in effect forcing 
certain kinds of allocations of the tickets, perhaps ½  to alumni and ½ to the students.  
The Court would also help evolve common law reflecting the common understanding 
among football ticket holders about what is fair and reasonable in the allocation. 
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Now, how about the reallocation from the initial endowment?   Lacking a viable 
response mechanism, we might see bigger and stronger individuals simply taking the 
tickets by force from the weaker even though the weaker were able to obtain more tickets 
initially. In both cases, the criminals or bullies (a law would have to be passed making 
football ticket bullies into criminals) might be brought to the court, and a judge in the 
Football Ticket Court may decide who is to have these tickets.  Alternatively, this might 
be a Legislative Matter, with season tickets reverting to the control of the legislature 
before each season, with the legislators rhetorically most capable being able to move 
tickets one direction or the other.  Or, we might also just wait for the natural evolution of 
a market, perhaps starting out as a black market, with scalpers on every corner at games, 
illegally buying and selling the tickets.  Eventually, there may be so many tickets 
exchanged this way that the illegal markets may be legitimized by a new law allowing 
market trade, in which case the Football Ticket Market could be said to have evolved 
spontaneously. 
As part of the spontaneity, we might also see a Football Ticket Bank, such that all 
holders of tickets could deposit extra tickets in the bank and be given credit, with others 
borrowing tickets from the bank. The idea would be that borrowers would at some future 
time obtain tickets and repay the draws.  Individuals active in the Football Ticket Market 
would work with the ticket brokers and speculators through the bank accounts.  In a 
market, sellers would not sell unless the buyers were willing to pay the mutually agreed 
to price. The Department of Football Ticket allocations may even hold back a few tickets 
from the Market, in which case they could hold an auction every fall, with the idea to stir 
a lively and active market with many transactions, which is necessary to establishing the 
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value of the tickets.  A thin market does not generate good values.   Over time, the market 
in football tickets would clear, re-clear, and clear again perhaps at different prices every 
year, as the football team wins and loses.  Various brokerage and deal-making services 
would evolve to help in facilitating the trading.  
In summary, 1) we  create and define scarcity;  2)  we generally find a way to 
initially set caps and allocate access to a scarce resource; and  3)  we usually find a way 
to reallocate the scarce resource over time, sometimes using markets and sometimes not.  
A variety of mechanisms, actually, mixes of mechanisms, are used. Said somewhat 
differently, what we see in the allegory is the real possibility that a multiplicity of 
legislative, administrative, special purpose district, judicial and market mechanisms could 
work together and lead to more satisfactory outcomes.  We now turn to using this 
framework in narrowing the range in possible mixes of carbon mechanisms. 
 
Regulatory Mechanisms with Direct Control 
 
Since the start of the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency in the early 1970s we have 
had a tendency to use direct, command and control regulatory approaches to solve 
environmental problems.  We set regulatory standards and mandate compliance, often 
with threats of fines or other strictures if one does not meet the standard. Agricultural 
uses of pesticides and herbicides, e.g., are controlled in the sense of  being required to 
apply no more than a specified amount  of the chemical, with it applied in certain ways, 
and the wastes (e.g., including even the vessels carrying the chemical to the farm) 
handled in specific, mandated sorts of ways.  Also, during the years of commodity price 
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support programs farmers were mandated to have a conservation plan approved by the 
federal government before one could obtain the commodity payments.  Yet, these kinds 
of programs can be effective, and have helped in many ways.  As one reviewer of this 
paper claimed, these kinds of programs “… have been extremely effective and have met 
their legislative intent.  Erosion on cropland was cut in half and wetland conversion on  
AG (Note: agricultural) land has nearly reached no net loss.”  It is conceivable, on 
momentum alone,  that such approaches will also play a role in addressing the carbon and 
global warming problem.  
Yet, it seems reasonable to argue that the regulatory approach will not have the 
strength of conviction during the next couple of decades that it has had in the past 30 
years.    Starting about 1990, we start to see a swing in the national mood on how to 
address environmental issues.  This swing seems a part of the general move toward ever 
more individuation and privatization of society, inclusive of agriculture and the food 
system. The path seems to be away from command-and-control with mandates, e.g., 
mandates on how much carbon (and other greenhouse gases) agriculture could emit or 
how much it will store, and toward a path oriented to voluntary action associated with 
participating or not, in emerging markets.  In a recent presentation to the American 
Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution, Senator Hagel, R-Neb called for 
crafting a plan, quoting the news reporter here (Seelmeyer, 2001) leading to “voluntary 
actions by government, industry and private organization to reduce or sequester 
greenhouse gas emissions as needed.”  This has been a theme in the current 
administration.  We also seem to be in the mood of moving away from direct regulatory 
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controls as we ask markets to do more. The fascinating question remains about the role of 
the government on this path. 
The Food and Agricultural  Improvement Act (farm bill) of 1996,  popularly 
referred to as the freedom-to-farm act, also placed agriculture on the market path.  
Farmers and ranchers were to orient decisions toward the market, especially finding ways 
to be competitive in the new global markets.  Yet, regarding the new 2001-2002 farm bill, 
we again see dialogue about providing green payments as a provision in that bill, 
reflecting the approach more commonly used prior to 1996.  It is difficult at this writing 
to predict the path, although it will probably be more along the line of a third way, with 
legitimate roles played by both government and market.   
 
Tax and Subsidy (Payment) Mechanisms 
 
Agricultural conservation programs have a long history of federal support in the form of 
providing for cost sharing and technical assistance for designing the installation of  
conservation technologies and  practices.  The wide array of programs currently available 
are summarized in the recent legislation (H.R. 1938) proposed by Representative Moran 
(Kansas) that proposes to extend and expand the conservation programs currently 
administered by the Department of Agriculture, including the 1) Environmental 
Conservation Acreage Reserve Program;  2) Conservation Reserve Program;  3) Wetland 
Reserve Program; 4)  Environmental Quality Incentives Program; and  the 5) Wildlife 
Habitat Incentives Program.  The first four programs are all separate sections of the Food 
and Security Act of 1985 (essentially, all pieces of the farm bill), which Representative 
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Moran is proposing be extended from its current termination date of 2002 to the year 
2012.  The Wildlife program is a section of the Federal Agriculture Improvement and 
Reform Act of 1996, which Moran is also proposing be extended to 2012.  All of  these 
could have an influence on how much carbon is sequestered in land.  
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is of special interest wherein 
individuals basically sell the capacity of the land to produce marketable crops for a 
payment from the government.   In effect, cropland is turned into grassland and held in 
reserve (it could be turned back to cropland at some later time) for said payment.  
Farmers and ranchers can bid land into the program with bids accepted at mutually 
agreed to prices to maintain the land in grass rather than cropland for a certain number of 
years, with payments made each year over the duration of the contract.  Due to its focus 
on moving cropland back into grassland, CRP works to sequester  substantive amounts of 
carbon, suggesting perhaps that the CRP program could be shifted to a carbon 
sequestration program as the CRP contracts reach their end.   
New legislation being considered as this paper is being written includes the 
“Conservation Security Act of 2001” introduced by Senator Harkin (D-Iowa) in the 
Senate (S. 932) and by Representative Thune (R-SD) in the House (H.R. 1949).  This act 
establishes a voluntary incentive program based on payments as high as $50,000 per farm 
per year to implement and continue conservation practices and systems.   It focuses on 
stewardship of land currently being farmed and ranched in contrast to set aside programs 
such as the CRP program.  Generally, it proposes to assist farmers and ranchers in 
practicing a wide array of conservation practices leading to enhancements in soil and 
water quality; air quality; biological diversity; and, for the purposes of understanding 
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how it relates to the carbon question, “reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and 
enhancement of carbon sequestration (S. 932, Section 1240Q(10)).” 
In light of the subsidies and government payments, both historically and as 
proposed in new legislation, it is intriguing that both soil and water quality associated 
with agricultural activity still is not what it could be. As Nowak and Korsching (1998, p. 
159) point out while citing reports by the U.S. GAO (1977) and USDA (1989), the 
efficacy of the variety of subsidy and payment programs that have historically focused on 
“… reducing soil loss, reducing further soil quality degradation, and maintain clean water 
often is questioned,” and perhaps need to be questioned.  A National Academy of 
Sciences (1993) study also cited in Nowak and Korsching (1998, p. 159) highlights the 
continued deterioration of soil quality, measured by such things as carbon content.  As 
Lockeretz (1990) has noted, the reason for this tendency toward payment (and regulatory) 
programs not achieving what is expected arises from our lack of understanding about 
what actually motivates farmers and ranchers to conserve and enhance natural resources. 
We only know that much more than financial aspects of the decision are at work (see 
Lynne and Casey, 1998), and little more.  The social and behavioral (economic) science 
is missing; conservation programs and policy have been viewed mainly as technical 
matters, perhaps a kind of reasoning that will have to be changed if carbon sequestration 
and massive storage of carbon in land is to be accomplished.   
In light of this experience, and reflecting a substantive lack of scientific 
understanding about the human and behavioral side of agriculture, it becomes reasonable 
to question the efficacy of subsidy and green payment mechanisms as the total answer in 
bringing about carbon sequestration in the future.  It is not at all clear, e.g., that farmers 
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and ranchers will respond the same to government payments as they might to market 
prices.  
Also, payment and regulatory programs have a tendency to lack consistency over 
time.  It is at best difficult to keep the public tax dollars moving into payment programs at 
a sufficiently high level such as to keep the programs effective over time.  Rather, we see 
a tendency for the public interest in conservation to wax and wane, with the 
representatives in congress acting accordingly to not always fully fund such programs.  
This could create special problems in the case of carbon sequestration, in that small 
amounts of carbon added to storage each year due to government programs supported 
over many years, and then suddenly dropped on some political whim, could result in all 
the gains in carbon storage being lost in a relatively short period of time.   Also, we 
simply do not know much about how subsidy payments in contrast to payments coming 
through a market compare in effectiveness, or how the two approaches complement or 
compete with each other.  
Tax mechanisms also face challenges, e.g., taxing the emissions of carbon and 
then using the collected revenue to perhaps support regulatory programs, or to cover the 
subsidies used to help firms change technologies.  Taxes to bring about environmental 
change have not generally been politically palatable in the U.S.  In Nebraska, even a 
relatively modest fertilizer tax that generated revenue for helping state agencies manage 
the nitrate pollution around well-heads was not popular, and, while operant for a few 
years with reasonably good results, was recently not reinstated.   The tax was not 
supported in either urban or rural segments of Nebraska. Intriguingly, it perhaps needs to 
be asked why those in urban areas who perhaps would benefit the most (relative to the 
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costs they would pay) from the possibility of higher quality water, perhaps even 
improvements in outdoor recreational activities like fishing, also would not be supportive 
of taxes to induce environmental enhancement.  While research is needed to know for 
sure, it probably reflects a general aversion to taxes, and even the word “tax” being much 
less acceptable than the word “price” to most, albeit a tax is essentially a price (although 
it is not set, or derived, in the same way as prices evolve in markets, which is probably 
why prices are preferred).  In this case of a fertilizer tax, the tax would raise the price to 
include part of the damages caused by the fertilizer.    
 It is still the case, however, we would probably face much greater overall damage 
and lower quality of our natural resources today if it had not been for the conservation 
programs and technical assistance of the past.  A reviewer of this paper noted how it is 
“also possible to argue that U.S. governmental programs have brought about marked 
improvements versus what would exist without those programs.”  We agree.  The actions 
taken to stopping and preventing recurrence of the Dust Bowl days of the 1930’s is case 
in point.  Many specific issue programs, e.g., the Conservation Reserve Program,  and 
programs to encourage conservation tillage of various kinds, have contributed 
measurably and substantively to carbon stocks and will continue to do so.  Regarding 
carbon content of soils and declining soil quality, generally, however, perhaps the  
legislation has not been comprehensive enough, an idea also reflected in the more all 
encompassing Conservation Security Act.   The many smaller pieces of conservation 
legislation in the past were not designed to completely correct the declining health of our 
nation’s waters and soil quality.  A more comprehensive program is needed, perhaps that 
proposed in this legislation.  The “fickle nature of government funding” was also 
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highlighted by a reviewer; as we noted earlier, long term commitments will be necessary 
in order to ensure that once carbon is added to the soil that it is not suddenly all released 
as government support is pulled away, even for short periods of time.  Importantly, 
government will have to play some role in bringing about reductions in emissions, and 
possible storage of the carbon in Nebraska land.    
 It seems, too, however, that the new cap and trade mechanisms that legitimize 
both a role for government and market will also play a role.  As one reviewer 
characterized it,  
 
 
The cap and trade mechanisms in theory makes energy users/carbon 
emitters (all of us) pay in accordance with our net carbon emissions, 
whereas tax mechanisms cost all of us, but not necessarily based upon our 
level of net carbon emissions – a net plus for markets.  The market may 
also be able to better negotiate credits at a somewhat lower price and 
better deliver the exact level of net carbon emissions you want.  Finally, 
however similar, the market approach avoids the stigma of having the 
word “tax” attached to it.  However, the market mechanisms will likely 
have some additional administrative costs and may conceivably have 
significantly higher measurement costs.   
 
We concur, although the contention of additional administrative costs needs study (it may 
actually be less costly), and see the need to consider a variety of government and 
regulatory programs mixed with various market and market-like mechanisms and 
institutions to bring about more carbon sequestered in any given year, and more carbon 
stored over the longer term.  
It also is only prudent, too, to move cautiously forward with using market 
mechanisms and institutions in the policy mix.  These mechanisms are not a panacea, 
although if an appropriate structure  can be built into the foundation  of a market, i.e., 
the market is built in such a way as to better ensure that it is just, equitable and fair.  
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Participants need to be able to see a shared value system to which each individual can 
subscribe. In this case, environmental markets hold the potential to in some ways work  
better than direct control; tax, subsidy; or green payment mechanisms.  We perhaps 
cannot emphasize enough that markets must be fair, equitable and just, or they will fail 
just as quickly and perhaps even more dramatically than the direct control, and the tax 
and subsidy mechanisms.   
As alluded to several times, it appears a kind of third way is emerging, a third 
path as it were, going beyond both the strictly market and the strictly government (i.e., 
regulatory and/or tax and subsidy approaches).  The question becomes:  Will such 
mechanisms appear spontaneously, or will we need to actively design a suitable market 
mechanism, suitable meaning both simultaneously efficient and fair as well as just, that 
will complement and otherwise work jointly with a certain amount of government 
involvement in the matter?  
 
Spontaneous Trade Evolving to an Optimal Mechanism? 
 
Several entities have emerged on the world scene since the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.  We 
place these activities in this section on the contention that such activities are a precursor 
of perhaps spontaneously evolving market trade in carbon emissions (and storage) among 
private entities.  Countries considering a domestic emissions trading system include 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, United Kingdom 
and the U.S.   Limited trading is already occurring within some of these countries. Global 
companies are also being positioned to participate in trading. The Kyoto Protocol has 
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encouraged emissions trading both within countries and across international borders even 
though it has yet to be, and perhaps never will be, ratified by sufficient numbers of 
nations to make it in any sense binding.    
One such entity is the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA). It 
proposes to provide an ongoing overview of the status of trading by countries and global 
companies (See: http://www.ieta.org/ ). It is based on the premise that it is in the interest 
of all involved that an international trading scheme emerge and leading to the lowest 
overall abatement cost possible.  This type of scheme will likely be the most useful after 
the second commitment within the Kyoto protocol in 2008, but it can also help during the 
preceding years.  The national trading schemes that emerge will all have their unique 
characteristics.  There could be elements that emerge which make them incompatible at 
an international level.  In order for these national markets to be working together 
efficiently by 2008, the “bugs” must be worked out before then.  That is why this time 
period leading  to 2008 can prove to be quite valuable, and perhaps explains why we are 
seeing emergence of groups like the IETA.  Facilitating these national schemes  to work  
together will enrich all involved by bringing together the diversity of all involved. This 
will enable the elements that need to be  standardized to become so, while at the same 
time preserving the distinctiveness of each individual approach (http://www.ieta.org/ ). 
Carbon offset markets are evolving in several places, with special attention being 
paid to the rainforest areas of central and South America.  Countries such as Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras see the potential  to profit from the capability of 
said areas to sequester more carbon at a faster pace and to hold larger quantities of carbon 
in place  for an indefinite period. The focus is on sustainable development (Stewart and 
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Tirana, 1998) and using carbon markets to enhance the environmental and profit 
opportunities in such regions.    
Certification companies are also emerging, e.g., SGS Société Générale de 
Surveillance, an inspection, testing, monitoring, and enforcement organization with 
offices in more than 140 countries.  SGS was recently employed by the Costa Rican 
government to certify the carbon stored in a rainforest area, with the intent that Costa 
Rica could eventually sell such carbon offsets on the world market (See: 
http://www.sgsgroup.com/SGSGroup.nsf/pages/costarica.html ). The certification of this 
carbon offset program could help ensure that over 1.25 million acres of Costa Rican 
forests are preserved.  This SGS certification is the first under the terms of the Kyoto 
agreement on climate change, and it offers the possibility that these forests will remove 
more than 1 million metric tons of carbon equivalent from the atmosphere.  These offsets 
could then be sold to companies in industrialized countries whose emissions exceed the 
agreed upon limits in the Kyoto Protocol.  
This kind of activity is also ongoing in the U.S. as represented in the Montana 
Carbon Offset Coalition. The Coalition is a quasi-public entity created with the help of 
the Montana Legislature.  Landowners can receive complete cost sharing to plant trees on 
land that is not naturally regenerating to trees.  In turn, they receive payments to store 
carbon in the land and the trees.  Contracts are signed for upwards of  100 years with the 
carbon credits transferred  to Montana Watershed, Inc., the private entity associated with 
the Coalition that actually holds the credits. The idea is to help corporations mitigate their 
carbon emissions through purchasing the carbon offset credits associated with the now 
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forested land (See: http://www.digisys.net/mwi/Welcome.html and 
http://www.carbonoffset.org/eligible.html ).    
As a case in point, through the negotiating help of the Chicago-based firm of 
Environmental Financial Products, LLC (an investment bank and consultancy, who 
specializes in the design and implementation of market-based environmental protection 
programs), the Coalition was able to help the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Indian 
Tribes of northwestern Montana sell carbon offsets to the Sustainable Forestry 
Management (SFM) group through their London, U.K. office (See: 
http://www.envifi.com/News/sfm_SandK.htm  ).  A total of 47,972 tons of CO2 
equivalent will be sequestered over an 80-year period through reforestation of 250 acres 
of pineland forest.  An investment by SFM will fund the reforestation of the land that was 
lost to fire.  The trade will be monitored by tribal foresters to ensure carbon storage is 
maintained for a 100-year period. 
The Pilot Emission Reduction Trading (PERT) program in Ontario, Canada is an 
industry-led organization that lays claim to memberships by many businesses and 
industries, as well as some government agencies and universities.  PERT operates as a 
think tank on issues relating to emissions trading especially in the Windsor-Quebec 
corridor.  It works at suggesting and designing trading rules that might work.  As noted 
on the PERT website, it sees the mission “to help shape future legislation and 
commitments on emissions (See:  http://www.pert.org/pert.html ).”    The Canadian 
government rewards private business and industry for participating in PERT.   This kind 
of an approach is also spreading to other parts of Canada, e.g., in the Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Reduction Trading Pilot (GERT) in Saskatchewan.   The GERT Pilot is a 
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"baseline and credit" mechanism, in the main privately operated, in contrast to a “cap and 
trade” mechanism where government plays a more direct role in setting limits.   Each site 
or project starts with a certified base of emissions, and then earns credits from reducing 
said emissions below the baseline by avoiding increases in emissions that would have 
otherwise occurred, or perhaps actually reducing current emissions.  The resulting credits 
can be sold to other companies (http://www.gert.org/faqs/#gert ).  Private businesses in 
Canada have been assured by the Canadian Government that credits certified now will be 
recognized in the future.  A multi-stakeholder technical committee reviews each project 
and trade to assess whether it has resulted in actual emissions reductions that are 
measurable and verifiable at levels above what is already required by law.  Again, a 
project such as GERT will provide practical experience for companies and industries so 
that they will be in a better position to contribute to future full-scale GHG emissions 
trading programs (http://www.gert.org/background/#ghgert). 
A consortium of power companies in Canada has also been actively searching for 
carbon offsets that they might apply against their baseline emissions.  In particular, a 
consortium of 10-power utilities that are responsible for 25% of Canada's GHG emissions 
and 55% of stationary point source emissions are negotiating payments with groups of 
farmers for installing an appropriate mix of  best management practices that increase the 
carbon stored on the farms within the tract of land associated with the group over several 
years. Payments would be made each year during the time practices are in place.  The 
idea is that the contracts would perhaps run for 10-20 years, with projections that 
payments of $0.50 to $1.50 per ton per year will bring farmers to shift to carbon 
sequestration practices.  Some U.S. farmers apparently  are already participating in this 
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initiative.  The  IGF Insurance Company, the fourth largest crop insurer in the U.S. with 
wide-spread operations in Iowa, has created a partnership with CQuest, a firm that helps 
implement carbon credit trading, to sell carbon emission reduction credits (CERCs).  A 
CERC is the equivalent of one metric ton of atmospheric carbon dioxide reduced from an 
agreed-upon baseline (Zeuli, 2000, p.  244).  These two companies have initially solicited 
carbon credits from farmers and other landowners in Iowa by working through IGF’s 
crop insurance agents’ network.  The companies use formulas developed by the USDA 
Natural Resource Conservation Service to calculate the amount of carbon that is 
sequestered under alternative conservation practices.  Price is negotiated independently 
for each contract.  According to one news release (PRNewswire, cited in Zeuli, p. 245),  
2.8 million metric tons of carbon credits have already been sold to the  Canadian 
consortium, although we have not been able to confirm that this event actually has 
occurred, or that any  money has actually changed hands.   Also, it is our understanding 
that IGF was negotiating options to buy carbon credits, rather than buying actual credits, 
and offering quite modest option payments.  
Several global firms are now positioned, and some are already involved in carbon 
offset trading.   For example,  Arthur Anderson, Credit Lyonnais and Natsource "have 
teamed ... to create an international carbon repository to serve the developing market in 
emissions trading (The Times of London, Monday, November 13, 2000, Business 
Section)." The  Chicago Climate Exchange has also emerged as the  "...first U.S. 
voluntary pilot program for trading of greenhouse gases.”  The pilot project is active in 
Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio and Wisconsin.  The initial proposition is for 
phased-in commitments, starting with a target of 2% below 1999 baseline emission levels 
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during 2002 and gradually declining by 1% per year thereafter.  Monitoring, verification, 
tracking, and reporting requirements will be implemented, and credits will be given for 
domestic and foreign emissions offset projects as well as certain carbon sinks 
(http://chicagoclimatex.com).  The expectation in March of 2001 was that trading in the 
U.S., Canada, and Mexico would be ongoing by 2003 (Phase 3 of the pilot project).   
Environmental Financial Products, LLC of Chicago is also involved in this pilot project 
funded by the Joyce Foundation in a contract with the Kellogg Graduate School of 
Management at Northwestern University.  
Innovest, an internationally recognized investment advisory firm, recently created 
the Innovest Carbon Finance Practice.  The Carbon Finance Practice provides clients with 
clear, company specific research into the business risks and opportunities that global 
climate change presents at the corporate level.  Their primary objectives are to: (1) 
understand and quantify the potential financial liabilities associated with carbon 
emissions generated through industrial processes and energy consumption; (2) 
benchmark corporate emissions profiles, financial exposure, and climate change strategy 
relative to industry standards; (3) optimize corporate greenhouse gas mitigation 
strategies; (4) identify hidden carbon-related assets and liabilities; and (5) stay abreast of 
strategic and operational best practices by tracking policy developments.   Current 
analyses do not include a company’s potential carbon risk exposure, which could 
represent as much as 40% of an energy-intensive manufacturing firm’s entire market 
capitalization (See: http://www.innovestgroup.com/carbonpractice.pdf).   
In response to this market void, Innovest offers services including company-
specific carbon risk profiles, custom portfolio analysis, reviews and analyses of policy 
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developments, and custom advisory and consulting services.  When creating a carbon risk 
profile, Innovest rates a company’s current carbon management practices, potential 
carbon risk, and potential carbon profit opportunities.  With these profiles, companies 
have a unique opportunity to be forward-thinking and to act more efficiently toward the 
emerging carbon market.  Innovest has teamed with leading law firms, global energy 
brokers, carbon commerce service providers, and energy future speculators in order to be 
as well rounded as possible when offering their services.  The target clients for Innovest’s 
Carbon Finance Practice package are investment banks, insurance companies, industrial 
corporations, strategic investors, and pension fund managers (See: 
http://www.innovestgroup.com/carbonpractice.pdf). 
Carbon banks are also emerging.  The International Carbon Bank and Exchange 
(See: http://www.carbonexchange.com/about/) “provides a platform that enables 
individual and corporate clients to keep track of Greenhouse Gases in a secure 
environment.”  Emission baselines and emission reduction credits (ERCs) can be 
established and then banked, retired, or made available on the market to consumers or 
industry.  A firm, for example, may start using wind energy in an action that produces 
ERCs, which can then be banked or sold.    Even individuals can cover their emissions 
through the Bank.  For example, a typical sports utility vehicle may emit 7-8 metric tons 
of carbon per year.  A consumer owning such a vehicle can voluntarily buy ERCs to 
cover these emissions through the ClimateSafe program (used for consumers).  A firm 
within an industry can similarly buy and sell ERCs through the CarbonExchange program 
(used for industry).  These offsets can be bought and sold in real-time on this website.  
The ICBE uses the revenue from this program to finance renewable energy systems in 
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home and community systems (http://www.carbonexchange.com).  This Bank and 
Exchange is operating under the “baseline and credits” notion, helping an individual,  
firm or industry verify and certify the baseline emissions and the changes made in the 
emissions leading to marketable credits.  The baseline and credits idea may involve 
government agencies (as in the Canadian GERT project), but does not necessarily do so, 
with the baseline and credits evolving mainly in the private sector.   
The spontaneous trading that is occurring right now is an encouraging sign of 
things to come.  The pilot projects that are taking place are helping both industry and 
consumers to become proactive when dealing with GHG emissions reductions.   By being 
able to establish baselines today, industries can monitor and reduce their emissions before 
any regulations are passed.  Then, if in the future carbon regulations are put in place, 
industries that have already acted can be rewarded for the reductions they have made 
according to their established baseline.  As noted earlier, the Canadian government, for 
example, has already assured industries that they will honor reductions that are occurring 
now from established baselines.  Similar assurances could be forthcoming within the U.S. 
as well.  Entities establishing baselines and certifying credits might also be rewarded by 
the market in being ready and able to move quickly if and when markets emerge. 
The many pilot programs illustrate there is significant interest in this area, and this 
interest is only growing.  This interest perhaps reflects the reality that once the 
government and public become more aware of what is occurring, the likelihood increases 
that laws will be passed placing caps on emissions levels.  Being proactive on a voluntary 
basis may also prove to be more cost efficient as compared to some point in time in the 
near future when they are required to take actions not to their advantage.  This 
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spontaneity, however, is still affected by the activities of governments even though not 
directed by government actions.  
 
Current Status of U.S. Stance on Reducing Emissions in Accord with the Kyoto 
Protocol, Including Recent Legislation 
 
 In March 2001, President Bush announced in a letter to Senator Hagel (R-NE) 
that the Administration would not regulate carbon emissions from power plants, in effect  
formally abandoning the emission targets set under the Kyoto Protocol (see Lindla, 
2001).  The Bush Administration cited a government study that indicated energy costs, 
especially in California and other parts of the western U.S., would increase substantively 
if controls were put on carbon dioxide emissions.  These formerly agreed-upon levels 
were to reduce emissions in the U.S. to 7% below 1990 levels during the period between 
2008-2012.  Currently, it is unclear when the U.S. will stabilize its carbon emissions.  A 
November 1997 report by the Energy Information Administration projects U.S. carbon 
emissions to be 45% above 1990 levels by 2020 (See: http://cnie.org/nle/clim-5.html).  
However, proposals addressing the 1997 protocol are still going forward.   
Two bills have been introduced into the 107th Congress propose a cap and trade 
system to address carbon emissions.  Bills (S. 556 and H.R. 1256) introduced by Senator 
Jeffords (I-VT)  and Representative Waxman,  (D-CA), would reduce and cap emissions 
of  carbon dioxide from electric generating facilities beginning in 2007.  Both the 
Jeffords bill titled the “Clean Power Act of 2001”  and the Waxman bill titled “Clean 
Smokestacks Act of 2001” would set aggregate carbon dioxide emissions from power 
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plants to the level in 1990, which was also the year of focus in the Kyoto protocol.  Both 
bills note that the regulations promulgated under this legislation “may include … market-
oriented mechanisms (such as emissions trading based on generation performance 
standards, auctions, or other allocation methods)… (S. 556, Sec. 132(b)(1)(B)(ii)).” 
At the international level, in Kyoto related developments, 178 countries agreed to 
sign a revised agreement during the Conference of the Parties meeting in Bonn, 
Germany, in July, 2001.  Perhaps the most substantive outcome is the feature that allows 
counting new carbon (since 1990) stored in forest, grazing and cropland against current 
emissions.  The U.S. chose not to be a party to this agreement, and it is not clear at this 
time what this implies for the overall success of the effort, due to the fact that the large 
U.S. economy contributes a substantive part of the total emissions of carbon.  It is likely 
that the new agreement will lead to at least some limited market trading in emissions, and 
perhaps in storage, within and among countries in the agreement.  Also, it is not clear if 
countries in the agreement choosing to cover emissions with storage could or would seek 
such storage in the U.S., although there does not seem to be any constraint on doing so. 
As highlighted in Lynne and Kruse (2001), the Montana Coalition has already helped 
some Montana Indian Tribes sell storage to a European entity through a brokerage, 
financial products firm in Chicago that is specializing in helping buyers and sellers find 
market clearing prices for storage (see http://www.carbon.unl.edu for further discussion 
of Kyoto, and current developments on both the domestic and international levels).    
Intriguingly, in terms of  market development in the U.S., the Environmental 
Protection Agency is already authorized under Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments to include market-oriented mechanisms, such as emissions trading, to 
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implement  reduction targets and meet aggregate emissions limits for certain air 
pollutants (See: http://cnie.org/nle/clim-5.html).    So, moving to emissions trading in 
carbon is not as dramatic a change in policy as it may sound, if at some point the U.S. 
decided to participate in the new Kyoto related agreement.  (Although nothing equivalent 
to trading in carbon storage exists in the 1990 Amendment:  Perhaps federal legislation 
would be needed to start trade in carbon storage). The EPA in consort with the private 
sector has already been operating a cap and trade mechanism in sulfur allowances, 
starting in  1993. 
 
 
Cap and Trade Evolving to a Satisfactory Mechanism:  Acid Rain and Sulfur 
Dioxide as a Case Study 
 
Perhaps we can learn from the acid rain and sulfur (dioxide) problem and the mix 
of mechanisms being used in its resolution. While the sulfur released from burning 
hydrocarbons does not drive global warming, it does result in more sulfur dioxide in the 
atmosphere which then converts to sulfuric acid through combining with water (vapor) in 
the atmosphere, eventually precipitating down wind as acidic atmospheric vapor, acid 
rain and acidic snow.  Acidic vapor and precipitation causes direct plant surface damage, 
while also reducing the ph of soil, making it more acidic which some plants cannot 
tolerate (although other plants thrive in it). The task is to describe what kinds of 
mechanisms emerged in the case of the acid rain problem involving 1) a cap on sulfur 
emissions, 2) an initial allocation of allowances, and  3)  a sulfur allowances market 
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especially active toward the end of each year, and then again in the early part of the year 
surrounding  a government sponsored auction of allowances every March.  We draw 
heavily on Ellerman et al. (2000).  The story starts back several years before the Title IV 
Amendment to the !990 Clean Air Act that helped the move to tradable emission 
allowances for sulfur.  As noted earlier, we now are seeing an emerging third- way 
approach to the environmental enhancement problem, with this  cap and trading  system 
in sulfur a case in point.  
 
Setting the Caps on Sulfur Emissions 
 
Initially, approximately a 10 million ton per year cap on national emissions was 
advertised, which was then to be adjusted downward to a 9 million ton per year cap by 
the year 2000 and beyond (Ellerman et al., 2000, p. 6).  It was decided to not place limits 
on emissions by region of the country but rather to treat emissions as a national problem 
even though  the science suggested that wind patterns would move more sulfur loaded 
precipitation to the northeastern areas of the country, and lead to some haze problems in 
other areas.  We need to keep in mind that the initial impetus for the sulfur program was 
the occurrence of acidic precipitation in the New England area of the northeastern U. S.  
and attributed to the use of high sulfur coal in Midwestern states.  One way to address 
this problem would have been to provide fewer allowances to the dirtiest generators in 
the Midwest.   
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 Initial Allocation of Sulfur Allowances 
 
Each generator, mostly  power plants, where each given a share of the overall limit as 
represented in 1-ton emission allowances.   The starting point was calculated based on the 
assumption of   (2.5 pounds of SO2 / million Btus of heat input) multiplied  by the 
baseline fuel amount used in the 1985-1987 period (Ellerman et al., 2000, p. 7).  
Ironically, the high sulfur burning power plants in the Midwest were given bonus 
allowances that recognized they produced more sulfur. These same firms were asked to 
install scrubbers, however, which then also gave them arguably more than a fair share of 
extra allowances to sell on the sulfur market. Western, generally newer power plants that 
were using lower sulfur coal or other fuel sources in the 1980s  were given allowances in 
accordance with their lower emissions, so to some extent bore part of the burden of the 
dirtiest generators in other areas.  
 
Interplay of Legislative, Administrative, Judicial, Special District and Market Forums in 
the Initial Allocation 
 
A long history of interaction among the various decision forums led to the initial 
amendments to the 1990 Clean Air Act.  The first legislation was put in place with the 
1970 Clean Air Act which set forward stringent command and control procedures for 
improving air quality.  It was clear by the time of the amendments in 1977 and again in 
1982 that the Act was not achieving what had been intended.  During the 1980s, 
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Midwestern and Appalachian high sulfur coal producing states effectively opposed any 
new acid rain controls.  Debates over burning the high sulfur coal from the eastern coal 
mines led to allowing such burning as long as the plants installed scrubbers, which was a 
gain for the high sulfur coal mines (Ellerman, 2000, p. 16) and a relative loss for western 
coal mines that had low sulfur coal.   The environmental movement of the late 1980s plus 
an administration open to market approaches to environmental enhancement brought the 
1990 Amendments.  The Environmental Defense Fund had proposed emissions trading 
(Ellerman et al., 2000, p. 22).  Some concerns were expressed in the early years, prior to 
implementing the markets, over the possibility of hot spots and the market being too thin 
to reveal true value.   We still moved ahead, with the Title IV amendments to create 
emissions trading eventually being approved on April 3, 1990 (Ellerman et al., 2000, p. 
29). 
 Ellerman et al. (2000, p. 34) warn how the subsequent political economic 
allocation of initial allowances could reflect the reality of disbursed costs and 
concentrated benefits, i.e., those with the most to gain lobbying effectively for the most 
allowances.   They carefully studied the role of special interests, and especially focused in 
on key committee chairs in the congress, as to document the influence each may have had 
on the distribution of allowances.  One would have expected some rent seeking, i.e., 
decisions in the specific interests of certain key congressional and committee leaders.  
Yet, they conclude that initial allocations were pretty much the result of majoritarian 
politics rather than special interests or chairs of key congressional committees being the 
driving force. Even so, the allocation was not particularly uniform, with the Midwestern 
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and some Eastern states gaining relative to the Western states, overall, with perhaps the 
exception of Georgia who lost (Ellerman et al., 2000, p. 74).    
 
Initial Trading and Outcomes 
 
Intriguingly, sulfur dioxide emissions were falling during the 10 years or so before the 
market was implemented in 1993 due in part to deregulation of railroads that lowered 
shipping rates for low sulfur coal, and making it financially feasible to ship the coal to the  
Midwest.  This was especially the case for locations within  600-1000 miles of western 
areas such as the Powder River Basin in Wyoming (Ellerman et al., 2000, p. 91).  
Arguably, these lower emissions were also due to the pending and actual changes in the 
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. The changing environmental mood and prodding by 
the administration in the late 1980s also perhaps  had some affect on the shift to the lower 
sulfur coal, albeit the financial incentives to do so were also strong.  
Starting in 1993,  all emitters had to demonstrate each year that they had a 
sufficient number of allowances in their portfolios to cover the emissions during the 
previous calendar year.  If not, they had to purchase allowances by January 31, or, if they 
had extra allowances, said allowances could be sold.  The EPA became the central 
repository for the data on what firms held how many allowances, including changes in 
holdings as the market started to operate.  The EPA in effect maintains a spreadsheet 
named the National Allowance Data Base (Ellerman et al., 2000, p. 38).  Intriguingly, 
emitters had  banked 7.4 million tons of allowances by 1997 for future use and emitted 
1/3 less than allowed in Phase I for the period 1995-1999, with Phase II covering the 
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period 2000 and beyond.   In the early years, most firms banked the allowances or traded 
them among plants within a company rather than place them on the market (Ellerman et 
al., 2000, p. 161).  Also, a substantive number of firms outside those identified at the 
outset volunteered  to be part of the program (Ellerman et al., 2000, p. 137) suggesting a 
moral dimension at work, i.e., many firms wanted to do the right thing even though not 
required to be in the market.  
Trading is done privately and no government review is needed; only the amount 
transacted has to be reported.  Auctions are also held by the EPA in March for a small 2-3 
percent of the allowances.   
   
Reallocations of Sulfur Allowances in the Market 
 
Starting with  Phase II in the year 2000, firms have moved to evermore external trading, 
including outside their own firms within a larger company, and to less banking of 
allowances.  Firms may buy and sell on the spot market, or in the market for allowances 
representing coverage of emissions in each of the next  seven years.    The March, EPA 
auction sells only spot (this year) and advance allowances for the seventh year.  
Intriguingly, the auction is revenue neutral with each firm receiving part of the revenue 
from the auction in proportion to shares held back from each firm.  
 Prices for a 1-ton allowance have varied from an initial range of about $150 in 
1994 to a low of $65 in 1996, and a high of $210 in 1998.  Prices have since stabilized in 
a $170 – 210 range. The most recent EPA Auction (March, 2001) yielded prices in the 
lower end of this range.  Intriguingly, prices are substantively lower than the simulation 
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models predicted prior to the markets being opened, suggesting costs of reducing sulfur 
emissions are lower than the models expected.  This was largely due to the models 
underestimating the extent of voluntary compliance and “over-investment” (using this 
term from Ellerman et al., 2000, p. 308) in compliance by the regulated firms.  We can 
attribute this to the models not accounting for the extent to which the moral dimension is 
at work, both the regulated and the unregulated wanting to the do the right thing.   As a 
result, the models had not accounted for the extra allowances available on the market.  
The commentary in Ellerman et al. (2000) suggests they see efficiency as the only 
motivation in a market, while the evidence suggests something else along the lines of 
doing the right thing as an ongoing reality.   
Several private financial and brokerage firms have become active in helping 
expedite the market including Cantor-Fitzgerald, Emission Exchange Corporation and 
Fieldston  Publications.   Individuals or groups (e.g., environmental groups) may also 
purchase or sell allowances.  An environmental group may wish to in effect retire an 
allowance by purchasing an allowance each year,   and thus contribute to an effective 
long-term reduction in the total number of allowances available on the market.  
 
Conclusions and Lessons for the Carbon Markets 
 
As Ellerman et al. (2000, p. 316) point out, trading can work; politics may play a lesser 
role than we might anticipate; markets where no markets existed before can develop; 
trading is surprisingly adaptive and can handle surprises; and, perhaps too many 
allowances were given away at the outset.  Generally, the sulfur market has been deemed 
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by most observers to be  a  success, reflecting a joint legitimization of both the 
government and the market… each has its role… in solving a serious environmental 
problem.  Yet, they warn us to be careful in extrapolating this case to  others.   The sulfur 
case reflects a small number of highly visible polluters all within one country, and all of 
which can be monitored (i.e., all emissions have to be measured and monitored, and 
emissions reported to the EPA).   The carbon dioxide case is far more complex, involving 
all countries on the planet and many sources, small and large, and no easy way to monitor 
who is emitting how much carbon dioxide when and where.  Also, the technologies 
available for reducing or removing carbon dioxide emissions are not as simply applied in 
that carbon is what we are burning when we use hydrocarbons, so it is pervasive and 
fundamental to the use of hydrocarbons, whereas sulfur is a relatively minor by-product.   
 The ways in which carbon dioxide is different than sulfur are very significant.  A 
comparison can be made with water quality.  Both regulatory and market approaches for 
point source surface water dischargers have been quite successful because the sources are 
relatively small in number and more easily found. However, non-point source pollution, 
especially to groundwater, has been far, far more difficult because the pollution can come 
from many sources and land uses and is even hard to measure.  In the case of carbon, the 
emissions come from all of us as well, and is even more difficult to measure.  As noted at 
the outset,  this is a public goods problem of global scale, and will likely require public 
action to solve, and markets will likely have to play a lesser, while still substantive, role. 
 Intriguingly, one of the most promising technologies to address the emissions 
problem is carbon sequestration, including sequestering the carbon in growing plants and 
in agricultural land.   As a result, much like with less costly low sulfur coal and scrubbers 
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as technologies applied to the sulfur problem, we would expect to see the application of 
carbon sequestration technologies in agriculture applied to the carbon dioxide problem.   
We might also posit that the prices of carbon allowances, if these are ever available on a 
carbon emissions market, will reflect the relative costs of  applying the technologies to 
store carbon in a variety of places, including that of agricultural land in Nebraska.  We 
can reasonably expect a relationship evolving as between the carbon emissions 
allowances market and the carbon storage market not unlike that which has evolved as 
between the low sulfur coal market and the sulfur (emissions) allowances market.   If 
carbon storage goes down in price, we would expect the carbon allowances market to 
also go down; similarly, a rising price in the carbon allowances market would tend to 
drive higher prices in the carbon storage market.  
Not unlike a hydrocarbon  fuels market (e.g., natural gas, crude oil, coal), except 
operating on much shorter time frames, we would expect the carbon (a hydrocarbon) 
stored in soil to fluctuate in price as supply and demand conditions change.  We need to 
think in terms of the root zone of agricultural crops in Nebraska as essentially a mine 
holding hydrocarbon (organic material) that has value on the carbon storage market.  The 
stock in the mine, i.e., the carbon in the root zone, increases and decreases with the flow 
of carbon into and out of the stock with the flow driven by market prices for the stock in 
place in the land.    
 As noted in Lynne and Kruse (2001), thinking of organic material/ carbon as a 
hydrocarbon in a mine also raises the possibility that carbon might fall under mineral law 
rather than under standard contract for services business law.  We refer the reader to 
Thorson (2001) regarding how carbon will be viewed in law and thus how the market 
 37
transaction can be structured.  Also, see Lynne and Kruse (2001) for more discussion of 
the connection of the economic market to the legal instrument used to expedite it. 
 
Conclusions and Final Considerations 
President Bush has noted that (Time, April 9),  “Our economy has slowed 
down…. We also have an energy crisis and the idea of placing caps on CO2 does not 
make economic sense.”  The President has also noted the great promise that technology 
holds in finding ways to capture, store and otherwise sequester carbon.   Events in the 
latter part of the year 2001 involving destruction of the World Trade Center in New York 
also suggests we face formidable problems in establishing world wide trade that is 
acceptable to at least most if not all, whether in emissions allowances and storage credits, 
or any other kinds of goods.  
In spite of these challenges,  we still face the reality of two kinds of  scarcity in 1) 
the capacity of the atmosphere to absorb carbon and  2) the capacity of  terrestrial 
systems, with the focus on agricultural land,  to store the carbon.  We also face the reality 
that these carry public good features, i.e., it is difficult to determine who is emitting how 
much carbon dioxide when and where, which generally, then, will require government 
involvement of some kind.  Market processes, such as carbon allowance and storage 
credit markets, will operate in consort with government programs.  
This paper focuses on alternative mechanisms to address that scarcity.  We seek a 
framework … a conceptual framework… within which to order our thinking and to help  
Nebraskans influence the kinds of mechanisms needed to solve the problem. By 
understanding the features of the main kinds of mechanisms, we are positioned to better 
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understand how to interact with others in the process of building appropriate 
mechanisms, e.g., green payment programs and/or carbon storage markets.     
We need to particularly assess the possibility that limits will be placed on carbon 
emissions.  If such limits are set as being proposed in S. 556 and H.R. 1256, i.e., scarcity 
is recognized and legitimized through government set caps, it is clear that carbon 
sequestration emerges as one possible action that perhaps can be used to help offset the 
scarcity in the atmospheric capacity.   At this point, it it could well become possible that 
we could use Nebraska’s terrestrial sinks (as well as other areas in the Great Plains) 
represented in agricultural lands to store substantive amounts of carbon.   At some point 
once the sale of carbon storage in place moves forward, we would also eventually 
experience scarcity in the capacity to sequester and to store carbon which then gives 
greater economic value to storage credits in place (see Lynne and Kruse, 2001) and 
representing carbon stored in ground.  It is the possibility of  Nebraskans being able to 
profit from selling or receiving a green payment for such credits on which we are focused 
in considering alternative mechanisms. 
 Four general kinds of mechanisms were delineated,  including 1) regulatory based 
direct  mechanisms;  2) tax and subsidy mechanisms;  3) spontaneous trade evolving to 
an optimal mechanism;  and,  4) cap and trade evolving to a satisfactory mechanism.  
Each has its own advantages and disadvantages.  In considering each, we need  to 
recognize that the conservation work of the past has helped in reducing soil erosion, and 
ensured enhancements through conservation of natural resources generally.   In looking 
to the future, we perhaps need to think creatively on how to mix and match the various 
mechanisms.  An especially promising new approach, that will likely prove long-term to 
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be a viable partner with other more commonly used control and subsidy programs is 
represented in the cap and trade  mechanism, as has been applied in reducing acid rain 
through government set caps on sulfur emissions and market trading in sulfur allowances.  
  Spontaneous evolution of carbon emission and storage markets without a 
proactive role by government is also a possibility.  A number of firms are investing 
substantive amounts of time and money, speculating that this path will bear fruit.  Yet, in 
light of recent steps taken by the current administration, and the experience with the 
sulfur allowances market, it is seems most likely we well eventually move down some 
variant of a cap and trade path instead. 
 This third way path recognizes an equally legitimate role for both government 
and market, with government working with the citizenry to set the cap, with the market 
playing the equally substantive role of handling the trading.   Producing offsets through 
storage of carbon in place within  farming and ranching operations requires technological 
and best management practice changes leading to the sequestration of carbon.  The 
market trading serves the additional role of helping find the least cost and most profitable 
way to implement technological changes either to reduce emissions or to provide storage.    
Nebraskans need to seriously consider how to be a productive player while 
working within such a cap and trade mechanism.  It appears that  cap and trade is a 
mechanism, an institutional design that when integrated with the various government 
approaches used in the past,  can be effective.  It is likely here to stay, and to be around in 
the longer run.  It behooves us to look to the more distant future such that we may be 
positioned to be a leader operating with new mechanism in the policy mix. One 
alternative is to take a case study approach to this problem, perhaps even developing a 
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simulated carbon storage market, and, thus positioning Nebraskans to eventually 
participate in an actual market.  Hahn (1998, p. 57) also concluded that the case-study or 
project, approach is a viable way in the face of great uncertainty to address the problems 
of mechanism design.  
In the interim, however, the possibility that the “Conservation Security Act of 
2001 (S. 932 and H.R. 1949)” will provide green payments for conservation practices 
bears watching.  Senator Harkin (who introduced the Senate version), the new chair of 
the agricultural committee, recently declared “There will be significant changes” (quoted 
in the High Plains Journal) in the new farm bill, including more and larger payments, 
incentives for farmers and ranchers to practice conservation generally which also 
generally means more carbon (organic matter) sequestered in the land. Also, the “Clean 
Power (and Smokestakes) Act of 2001 (S. 556 and H.R. 1256)” would put in place 
aggregate emissions limits on carbon dioxide much like the limits placed on sulfur 
emissions in the Title IV, 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act.   If by chance some 
version of both sets of bills are passed, we will likely see a mixture of green payments 
through more comprehensive government based conservation programs and  prices 
emerging in markets for carbon stored in place.   Payments and prices can jointly prove 
effective, as government and market work together in productive partnership.     
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